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Abstract. We define a class of dialogue games and prove that existence
of winning strategies for the Proponent in this class of games corresponds
to validity in classical propositional logic. Many authors have stated sim-
ilar results without actually proving the correspondence. We modify the
games used for intuitionistic logic given by Fermüller [3]. We employ
standard dialogue games and a standard sequent calculus for classical
logic. The result is a simple correspondence between dialogue games and
classical logic.
1 Introduction
Dialogue games as a semantics for intuitionistic logic (IL) were developed by
Lorenzen in the 1950s as an alternative to the operative approach to logic [8,
9]. A dialogue game is a finitary open two-person zero-sum game between the
Proponent P and the Opponent O. Lorenzen’s goal was to isolate a certain class
of dialogue games such that P has a winning strategy for the dialogue game
beginning with ϕ iff ϕ is a theorem of IL.
The first recognized successful proof for IL was given by Felscher [2]. Felscher’s
proof, though correct, is both complicated, with its introduction of the notion of
protableaux, and difficult to understand. Fermüller [3] provides a variant of the
E rules which allows him to give a simpler proof of the correspondence, without
intermediate recourse to protableaux (the proof also appears in [4]). Our goal in
this paper is to modify Fermüller’s games and prove that these modified games
characterize classical validity; we do this in §3.
2 Previous work
Numerous classes of dialogue games for classical logic have been defined in the lit-
erature, but with few exceptions, the correspondence between the class of games
⋆ The first and third authors were funded by the FCT/NWO/DFG project
“Dialogical Foundations of Semantics” (DiFoS) in the ESF EuroCoRes pro-
gramme LogICCC (FCT LogICCC/0001/2007; LogICCC-FP004; DN 231-80-002;
CN 2008/08314/GW). The authors would like to thank Morton Heine Sørensen for
comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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and classical validity is merely asserted, and not proved [1, §2], [5, pp. 352–53], [6,
pp. 217–18], [7, p. 305], [9, p. 194], [10, §1.5], [11, §2], [12, passim], [14, p. 152].
The three exceptions are due to Fermüller and Sørensen & Urzyczyn. In [3],
Fermüller defines classes of “parallel” dialogue games which capture various in-
termediate logics, including classical logic, characterized by various hypersequent
calculi. In [13], Sørensen and Urzyczyn offer an elegant and compact correspon-
dence between Felscher’s dialogues for classical logic and a “dialogue-inspired”
variant of the sequent calculus LK for classical logic that they call LKD. The
calculus LKD has only three rules: a left-rule, a right-rule, and one structural
rule, cut, which can be eliminated [13, Cor. 3.4]. The left and right rules have
side conditions that are built directly from the dialogue rules for attacks and
defenses of formulas; this justifies the presence of only two logical rules in the
calculus, rather than the customary array of left and right rules for each of the
connectives.
Our result in this paper improves on both Fermüller’s and Sørensen and
Urzyczyn’s proofs. We show that, in the classical case, Fermüller’s use of par-
allel dialogue games and hypersequents can be avoided, and that a correspon-
dence with a standard sequent calculus, rather than Sørensen and Urzyczyn’s
“dialogue-inspired” version can be established.
3 Classical dialogical logic
Our language is a basic propositional language with a designated atom ⊥ (fal-
sum). We define ¬ϕ as ϕ →⊥. We will also make use of so-called symbolic attacks,
∧L, ∧R, and ?.
Dialogue games are specified by two types of rules, particle (local) rules and
structural (global) rules. Particle rules (see Table 1) give the attack and defense
conditions for each type of formula; note that we allow attacks on atoms, but
these attacks cannot be defended. Structural rules define which sequences of
dialogical moves will count as legal dialogues. A dialogue is a sequence of attacks
and defenses that begins with a finite (possibly empty) multiset Π of formulas
that are initially granted by O and a finite (nonempty) multiset ∆ of formulas
that are initially disputed by O. Formulas that have been initially granted by
O can be attacked by P at any time, and formulas that are initially disputed
by O can be asserted as a defense by P at any time. In the case where ∆ is a
singleton, we can understand the game as beginning with an assertion of ∆ by
P, with the first move then being an attack on ∆ by O.
Definition 1 (CL structural rules).
Start The first move of the dialogue is carried out by O and consists in an
attack on (the unique) initially disputed formula ϕ.
Alternation Moves strictly alternate between players O and P.
Atom Atomic formulas, including ⊥, may be stated by both players, but only O
can attack them.
E Each move of O reacts directly to the immediately preceding move by P.
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Assertion Attack Response
p (atomic) ? —
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧L ϕ
∧R ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ ? ϕ or ψ
ϕ→ ψ ϕ ψ
Table 1. Particle rules for dialogue games
Definition 2 (Active formula). The most recent formula which P has as-
serted that O must attack in the next round is the active formula, if it exists.
Definition 3 (Winning conditions (for P)).
WCL The game ends with P winning if Π ∩∆ 6= ∅.
W⊥ The game ends when ⊥ is granted.
To establish the correspondence between classical validity and (existence of)
winning strategies, we use a variant of the sequent calculus systemGKcp [15] for
classical propositional logic, which is itself a variant of the standard contraction-
and weakening-friendly formulation of LK that copies the principal formula into
the premise (or premises).
Definition 4 (The system GKcp′). Derivable objects are sequents Π ⇒ ∆,
where Π and ∆ are multisets of formulas. The sequent system GKcp′ is specified
by the axioms and rules in Figure 1, together with the usual weakening and
contraction rules on both the left and the right, as well as cut.
Axioms: ϕ,Π ⇒ ∆,ϕ and ⊥, Π ⇒ ∆
A ∨B,A,Π ⇒ ∆ A ∨B,B,Π ⇒ ∆
∨L
A ∨B,Π ⇒ ∆
Π ⇒ ∆,A ∨B,A,B
∨R
Π ⇒ ∆,A ∨B
A ∧B,A,B,Π ⇒ ∆
∧L
A ∧B,Π ⇒ ∆
Π ⇒ ∆,A ∧B,A Π ⇒ ∆,A ∧B,B
∧R
Π ⇒ ∆,A ∧B
A→ B,Π ⇒ ∆,A A→ B,B,Π ⇒ ∆
→L
A→ B,Π ⇒ ∆
A,Π ⇒ ∆,A→ B,B
→R
Π ⇒ ∆,A→ B
Fig. 1. Axioms and rules for GKcp′.
This system differs from ordinary GKcp in that we do not require the ϕ in the
first axiom to be atomic.
Proposition 1. A,Π ⇒ A → B,∆ is provable in GKcp′ iff Π ⇒ A → B,∆
is provable in GKcp′.
Proposition 2. A,Π ⇒ A → B,B,∆ is provable in GKcp′ iff A,Π ⇒ A →
B,∆ is provable.
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Theorem 1. Every winning strategy τ for Π ⊢ C,∆ (i.e., for dialogue with
initially disputed formula C where player O initially grants the formulas in Π
and disputes the formulas in ∆) can be transformed into a GKcp′-deduction
of Π ⇒ C,∆.
The proof of Thm. 1 is a straightforward adaptation of Fermüller’s Thm. 1 [3].
Our proof that if ϕ is classically valid, then there exists a winning strategy for
ϕ in our classical dialogue game is constructive: we will map strongly analytic
GKcp′-deductions into winning strategies.
Definition 5. A GKcp′-deduction is called strongly analytic if it contains no
application of weakening, contraction, or cut.
It is a well-known fact that:
Lemma 1. GKcp′ ⊢ Π ⇒ ∆ iff there exists a strongly analytic deduction of
Π ⇒ ∆ in GKcp′ [15].
Lemma 2. Π ⇒ ∅ is provable in GKcp′ iff Π ⇒⊥ is provable in GKcp′.
This brings us to the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2. For every strongly analytic GKcp′-deduction of Π ⇒ ∆ and for
every formula ϕ in ∆, there exists a winning strategy for the dialogue whose
initial dialogue sequent is Π ⊢ ∆ and for which O’s initial attack is against ϕ.
Proof. In light of Lemma 2, we may assume that ∆ is non-empty. The proof is
by structural induction.
(1) The end-sequent Π ⇒ ∆ of δ is an axiom because there exists a formula
A such that A ∈ Π and A ∈ ∆. Regardless of which formula in ∆ that O attacks
initially, it is clear that after this initial move we reach a winning state for P.
(2) The end-sequent Π ⇒ ∆ of δ is an axiom because ⊥∈ Π. The existence
of a winning strategy here, regardless of the formula of ∆ initially attacked by
O, is as in the previous case.
(3) The final rule application of δ is → R. That is, δ ends as follows:
A,Π ⇒ A → B,B,∆
→ R
Π ⇒ A → B,∆
We build a winning strategy for Π ⇒ A → B,∆ and for any initially disputed
formula ϕ in {A → B} ∪ ∆ as follows. The game begins with an attack by O
on ϕ. The dialogue state is now Π ′ ⊢ A → B,∆, where Π ′ is Π in case ϕ is
not an implication and Π ∪ {C} in case ϕ is an implication C → D. P responds
by asserting A → B (this is one of the initially disputed formulas). Since P’s
move is a defense, by Rule E, in the next round O must attack this assertion
by asserting the antecedent A. Let P defend against this attack by asserting B;
we are now at an O-node and the dialogue state is A,Π ⊢ A → B,∆′. By the
induction hypothesis, for this sequent we have a winning strategy τ . Simply glue
τ to the end of the linear order of length 4 that we have defined so far. The
result is a winning strategy, because we have accounted for all possible moves
by O.
The remaining cases (for L→, ∨ and ∧) are analogous.
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4 Conclusion
We have provided a class of dialogue games and proved that existence of winning
strategies for the Proponent in these games corresponds to classical derivability
in the sequent calculus system GKcp′. Our proof improves on two previous
results by using standard dialogue games instead of parallel dialogue games, as
well as a standard classical sequent calculus.
References
1. Clerbout, N., Gorisse, M.H., Rahman, S.: Context-sensitivity in Jain philosophy:
Siddhars.igan. i’s Commentary on the Handbook of Logic. Journal of Philosophical
Logic pp. 1–30 (2010)
2. Felscher, W.: Dialogues, strategies, and intuitionistic provability. Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic 28, 217–254 (1985)
3. Fermüller, C.G.: Parallel dialogue games and hypersequents for intermediate logics.
In: Mayer, M.C., Pirri, F. (eds.) TABLEAUX 2003. pp. 48–64 (2003)
4. Fermüller, C.G., Ciabattoni, A.: From intuitionistic logic to Gödel-Dummett logic
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